tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-88816987698914784832024-03-19T06:10:50.185-07:00Donald WittmanProfessor of Economics, UC Santa CruzDonald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.comBlogger5125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8881698769891478483.post-83743695413538120312006-12-17T15:11:00.026-08:002024-01-27T22:03:50.458-08:00Welcome!<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDUslDhDdEUy4c_nxy5haurrKh8wQ1VxCwLGzFXtbFUSmMCULlo3gCllLNjeiibiuHTsMZsEifLE0NWhP2pnk3VxrFxHn5vk9YK2nPWJlYMamttV8jrx0GjvIC0lS8LigipzGGRdXloqP4/s1600-h/halfcoin-1.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5012932324641660466" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjDUslDhDdEUy4c_nxy5haurrKh8wQ1VxCwLGzFXtbFUSmMCULlo3gCllLNjeiibiuHTsMZsEifLE0NWhP2pnk3VxrFxHn5vk9YK2nPWJlYMamttV8jrx0GjvIC0lS8LigipzGGRdXloqP4/s320/halfcoin-1.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px;" /></a><br />
<span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span style="font-size: 100%;"><span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span style="font-family: "arial";">I'm an emeritus professor in the </span><a href="http://econ.ucsc.edu/" style="font-family: arial;">Department of Economics</a><span style="font-family: "arial";"> at the </span><a href="http://www.ucsc.edu/" style="font-family: arial;">University of California, Santa Cruz</a><span style="font-family: "arial";">. I use the tools of economics to explain a wide variety of subjects, including law (torts, contracts, takings, litigation, and the good Samaritan rule), democratic politics (candidates, voters, pressure groups, and legislatures), international relations (war, the size of nations, and arms control verification), purely economic topics (contests and mechanism design) and an assortment of unrelated topics (sports rules, theocracy, and family dynamics).</span></span></span></span></span><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">My most recent publications are </span><span style="font-family: arial;"> "The University of California Was Wrong to Abolish the SAT: Admissions When Affirmative Action Was Banned" Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, forthcoming 2024. </span><span style="font-family: arial;"> "District vs At-Large Voting: When district voting results in worse policy for minorities, </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;">European Journal of Political Economy, Forthcoming 2024. </span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"><span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span style="font-family: arial;">Here are three of my less cited but more fun to read articles.</span></span></span><div><span face="Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif"><span style="font-family: arial;"><span style="font-size: small;"> "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/working.papers/strategic.religions.pdf">Strategic behavior and organizational structure of religions</a>" </span><span style="font-size: small;"><i>British Journal of Political Science </i>(2014).<i> </i>The articles explains why Popes tend to be appointed when they are old, while Archbishops of the Anglican Church tend to be appointed at a much younger age, and why the LDS Mormon Church leaders are older when they become leaders while other Mormon churches tend to appoint younger leaders.</span></span></span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span style="font-size: small;"> </span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial;"><span><span face="-webkit-standard">"</span><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.family.pdf">The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis</a><span face="-webkit-standard"> </span><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.family.pdf">and Psychological Advice</a><span face="-webkit-standard">" </span><span face="-webkit-standard" style="font-style: italic;">Kyklos</span><span face="-webkit-standard">, 2005. </span><span><span>This article shows how to </span>minimize<span> behavioral externalities within families, and explains why, </span></span></span></span><span style="font-family: arial;">when dealing with family members,</span><span style="font-family: arial;"> liability rules are better than Pigovian punishments.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> "Efficient Rules of Thumb in Highway Safety and Sporting Activity," </span><span style="font-family: arial; font-style: italic;">American Economic Review</span><span style="font-family: arial;">, (1982). This article provides a transaction cost explanation for allocating the right to possess the ball in basketball and parallel issues in other sports and in highway safety.</span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"><br /></span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;">I have also written op-eds directed to a more general audience: </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> Fossil-Fuel Divestment Is a Waste of Energy (The Chronicle of Higher Education, September 9, 2019); and </span></div><div style="text-align: left;"><span style="font-family: arial;"> Rent Control Pits Tenants Against One Another (LA Times, October 19, 2018, with Jesse Cunha).</span></div><div><span style="font-family: arial;"><span face="arial, helvetica, sans-serif"><span face="-webkit-standard"><br /></span></span><span face=""arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif"><span style="font-size: small;"> Here is a list of all my professional <a href="http://wittman.blogspot.com/2006/12/publications.html">publications</a>.</span></span></span></div></div>Donald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8881698769891478483.post-48529945036136628982006-12-17T14:10:00.001-08:002024-01-27T21:59:24.334-08:00Curriculum Vitae<span style="font-weight: bold;">Contact Info</span><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span>Donald Wittman<br />Emeritus Professor of Economics<br />University of California Santa Cruz<br />Santa Cruz, CA 95064<br /><br /><br />wittman@ucsc.edu<br /><a href="https://economics.ucsc.edu/faculty/economics-emeriti.php?uid=wittman">https://economics.ucsc.edu/faculty/economics-emeriti.php?uid=wittman</a>/</div><div>wittman, blogspot.com</div><div><br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Employment</span><br />1980- University of California, Santa Cruz, Professor of Economics<br />1976-80 University of California, Santa Cruz, Associate Professor of Economics<br />1974-76 University of Chicago, Assistant Professor of Political Science<br />1969-74 University of California, Santa Cruz, Assistant Professor of Economics<br />1968-69 University of California, Berkeley, Lecturer<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Education</span><br />1970 University of California, Berkeley, Ph.D.<br />1966 University of California, Berkeley, M.A.<br />1964 University of Michigan, B.A.<br />1962-63 University College, London<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">NSF Funding</span><br />1979-82 "The Economic Analysis of Legal Rules and the Issues of Timing and Compensation." National Science Foundation<br />1982-84 "Econometric Studies of Civil Trials and Arbitration Settlements." National Science Foundation<br />1993-95 "Development of Applied EconomicsLaboratory Courses." with Daniel Friedman. National Science Foundation<br /><br /><span style="font-weight: bold;">Editorial Board</span><br />1997-- Economics of Governance</div><div>2016-- Homo Oeconomicus</div><div><br /></div><div><br /></div>Donald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8881698769891478483.post-64632392551230896972006-12-17T14:06:00.000-08:002016-12-15T12:47:31.313-08:00Classes & Lectures<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_JpXOpalZgLqCUG62CZTdf2xmV9O6HgHKW-BnSIy-br3W4OxXIcXGHKMmA_KiS-GbL7R4wOUCeyChKPVSlIc2Tbszkw_COUXxwqQkZGNAAMzq9kmafk03DQOvX8CTxU21dkjqQEeSOO_h/s1600-h/halfcoin-1.jpg"><img alt="" border="0" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5012932573749763650" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_JpXOpalZgLqCUG62CZTdf2xmV9O6HgHKW-BnSIy-br3W4OxXIcXGHKMmA_KiS-GbL7R4wOUCeyChKPVSlIc2Tbszkw_COUXxwqQkZGNAAMzq9kmafk03DQOvX8CTxU21dkjqQEeSOO_h/s320/halfcoin-1.jpg" style="cursor: pointer; float: right; margin: 0pt 0pt 10px 10px;" /></a><span style="font-family: Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; font-weight: bold;">CLASSES</span><br />
<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/100c.html"><br /></a>
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/~wittman/classes/econ-113/">ECONOMICS 113</a>: Introduction to Econometrics</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/~wittman/classes/econ-115/">ECONOMICS 115</a>: Management Science</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/~wittman/classes/econ-169/">ECONOMICS 169:</a> Economic Analysis of Law</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/~wittman/classes/econ-204a">ECONOMICS 204A</a>: PhD Micro Economic Theory A</span><br />
<span style="font-family: "arial" , "helvetica" , sans-serif;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/~wittman/classes/econ-204c">ECONOMICS 204C</a>: PhD Micro Economic Theory C</span>Donald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8881698769891478483.post-22670747215886363752006-12-17T14:05:00.011-08:002024-01-27T21:29:44.050-08:00Publications<span style="font-weight: bold;">BOOKS </span><br />
<div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span><b>1</b>. <i><a href="The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series" target="_blank">Economics of Governance.</a> </i>The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics (edited) </div><div> Edward Elgar, 2017.</div><div><br /></div><div><b>
2</b>. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Handbook-Political-Economy-Handbooks-Science/dp/0199272220/sr=8-2/qid=1166399414/ref=pd_bbs_sr_2/105-6729254-4902068?ie=UTF8&s=books" style="font-style: italic;">Oxford Handbook of Political Economy</a>. Co-edited with Barry Weingast, Oxford University Press, </div><div> 2006. Translated into Chinese (forthcoming)</div><div><br />
<div><b>
3</b>. <span style="font-style: italic;"><a href="http://www.amazon.com/Economic-Foundations-Organization-Donald-Wittman/dp/0521685249/sr=8-1/qid=1167164885/ref=pd_bbs_1/002-9420346-4699225?ie=UTF8&s=books">Economic Foundations of Law and Organization</a>, </span>Cambridge University Press, 2006.</div><div>.<br /><b>
4</b>. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Economic-Analysis-Law-Selected-Readings/dp/0631231587/sr=1-2/qid=1167165029/ref=sr_1_2/002-9420346-4699225?ie=UTF8&s=books"><span style="font-style: italic;">Readings in the Economic Analysis of Law</span></a>. (edited) Blackwell, 2003..<br />
Translated into Chinese by Li Su, 2006, Law Press China</div><div><br /><b>
5</b>. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Myth-Democratic-Failure-Political-Institutions/dp/0226904237" style="font-style: italic;">The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are </a> <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Myth-Democratic-Failure-Political-Institutions/dp/0226904237" style="font-style: italic;">Efficient</a>, </div><div> University of Chicago Press, 1995. <br />
"American Political Science Association: Best Book or Article in Political Economy-1994, 1995 or </div><div> 1996"<br />
Translated into Portuguese by Alvaro de Sa and Renata E. A. de Lima.<span style="font-style: italic;"> </span></div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> O Mito do </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Fracas da Democracia</span>, Bertrand Brasil, 1999.<br />
Translated into Japanese by Katsuyoshi Okui 2003.</div><div><br />
6. <a href="http://www.amazon.com/Federalist-Papers-New-Institutionalism-Representation/dp/0875860850/sr=1-6/qid=1167165737/ref=sr_1_6/002-9420346-4699225?ie=UTF8&s=books"><span style="font-style: italic;">The Federalist Papers: The New institutionalism and the Old</span>,</a><br />
co-edited with B.Grofman, Agathon Press, 1989<br />
<br />
<span style="font-weight: bold;">ARTICLES IN JOURNALS</span></div><div><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div><div><span>1.</span><span style="font-weight: bold;"> "</span>The University of California Was Wrong to Abolish the SAT: Admissions When Affirmative Action Was Banned" <i>Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice, </i>forthcoming 2024.</div><div><br /></div><div>2. "District vs At-Large Voting: When district voting results in worse policy for minorities,<i> </i></div><div><i>European Journal of Political Economy</i>, Forthcoming 2024.</div><div><br /></div><div>3. "Average Rank and Adjusted Rank are better Measures of College Success than is GPA", </div><div> <i>Educational Measurement: Issues and Practice,</i> Winter 2022.</div><div><br /></div><div>4 "Darwinian Depression" <i>Journal of Affective Disorders, </i>October 2014.</div><div><br />
5. "Strategic Behavior and Organizational Structure in Religions"<br />
<i> British Journal of Political Science, </i>October 2014<i>.</i><br />
<i> </i>Reprinted in <i>Economics of Governance</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div>
<div>6. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.pressureactivate.pdf">How pressure groups activate voters and move candidates closer</a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.pressureactivate.pdf"> to the</a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.pressureactivate.pdf">median</a>" </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;"> Economic Journal,</span> (2009).</div><div>
Reprinted in <i>Economics of Governance</i></div><div><i><br /></i></div>
<div>
7. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.bargaininginwar.pdf">Bargaining in the shadow of war: when is a peaceful resolution most</a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.bargaininginwar.pdf">likely?</a>" </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;">American Journal of Political Science</span> 53:588-602, 2009.</div><div><br /></div>
8. "Why Theory Choosing is better than Hypothesis Testing" </div><div><i> Homo</i><i> Oeconomicus, </i>543-549. ( 2009).</div><div><br /></div><div><div>9. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.statusquobias.pdf">Is Status-quo bias consistent with downward sloping demand</a><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.statusquobias.pdf"> curves?</a>" </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;"> Economic Inquiry,</span> 46: 283-288, (2008).</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
10. "Targeted information and strategic behavior by uninformed voters"<br />
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;"> Economics of Governance,</span> 9:87-100. (2008).</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
11 "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.candidatequalityejpe.pdf">Candidate quality, pressure group endorsements and </a><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.candidatequalityejpe.pdf">the nature </a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.candidatequalityejpe.pdf">of political advertising</a>" </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> European Journal of Political </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Economy</span>, 23: 360-378, (2007).</div><div><br />
12. "Litigation with two-sided incomplete information and symmetric bargaining" </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Law</span>, <i>Economics, and Organization</i>, 23: 98-126, (2007).</div><div><br />
13. "The Power and the glory of the median voter: Reply to Caplan"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;">Economic Journal Watch</span>, (2005).</div><div><br />
14. "On the methodology of testing for voter irrationality: A response to 'From Friedman to Wittman'"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Economic Journal Watch</span>, 2005.</div><div><br />
15. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.family.pdf">The Internal Organization of the Family: Economic Analysis </a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.family.pdf">and Psychological Advice</a>"</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Kyklos</span>, 2005.<br />
Reprinted in <i>Economics of Governance </i></div><div><i><br /></i>
16. " Valence Characteristics, Costly Policy and the Median-Crossing Property: </div><div> A Diagrammatic Exposition" <span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice</span>, (2005).</div><div><br />
17. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.arbitration.pdf">Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators and the Arbitrator Selection </a><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.arbitration.pdf">Hypothesis</a>,"</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">American Law and Economic Review</span>, (2003) (<a href="http://econ.ucsc.edu/faculty/wittman/arbitvsjury.pdf">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />
18. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.implementation.pdf">Implementation with Partial Verification</a>," with Nirvikar Singh,<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Review of Economic Design</span>, 63-84 (2001) (<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/abstracts.html#implementation">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />19. "Contests Where There is Variation in the Size of Effort,"with Nirvikar Singh, </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Economic Theory</span>, 711-744 (2001). (<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/abstracts.html#contests">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />
20. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/nations.pdf">The Size and Wealth of Nations</a>," </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Conflict Resolution</span>, 868-884 (2000). (<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/abstracts.html#The%20wealth%20and%20size%20of%20nations">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />
21. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.learningliability.pdf">Learning Liability Rules</a>," with D. Friedman, S. Crevier and A. Braskin,<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>,145-164 (1997) (<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/article.abstracts.html#LEARNING%20LIABILITY%20RULES">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />
22. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.incumbents.pdf">Why Voters Vote for Incumbents but Against Incumbency: </a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.incumbents.pdf">A Rational Choice Explanation</a>," </div><div> with D. Friedman, <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Public Economics</span>, 67-83 (1995) (<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/article.abstracts.html#WHY%20VOTERS%20VOTE%20FOR%20INCUMBENTS%20BUT%20AGAINST%20INCUMBENCY:">abstract</a>)</div><div><br />
23. "Nash Equilibrium vs. Maximin: A Comparative Game Statics Analysis," </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> European Journal of Political Economy</span>, (1993)</div>
<div> Reprinted in Donald A Walker (Ed.) <i>Equilibrium</i>. Edgar Elgar Publishers, 2000.</div><div><br />
24. "Nations and States: Mergers and Acquisitions; Dissolutions and Divorce,"</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings</span> (1991).</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
25. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.armscontrol.pdf">Arms Control and other Games Involving Imperfect Detection</a>,"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> American Political Science Review</span>, 923-948 (1989)</div><div><br />
26. "Why Democracies are Efficient," <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Political Economy, </span>1395-1424 (1989). <span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span><br />
Reprinted in C. Rowley (ed.) <span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice Theory</span>,<br />
Edward Elgar Publisher (1993).</div><div><br />
27. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.pressuregroup.pdf">Pressure Group Size and the Politics of Income Redistribution</a>,"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Social Choice and Welfare,</span> 275-286 (1989)</div><div><br />28. "Dispute Resolution and the Selection of Cases for Trial:<br />
A Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data,"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Legal Studies, </span>313-352 (1988).</div><div><br />
29. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.contests.pdf">Economic Contests with Incomplete Information and Optimal</a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.contests.pdf"> Contest</a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.contests.pdf">Design</a>," </div><div> with Nirvikar Singh, 34 <span style="font-style: italic;">Management Science</span>,528-540 (1988).</div><div><br />
30. "Final Offer Arbitration," <span style="font-style: italic;">Management Science</span>, 1551-1561 (1986)</div><div>.<br />
31. "The Price of Negligence," <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Law and Economics</span>, 151-163 (1986)</div><div>.<br />
32. "Counter-intuitive Results in Game Theory,"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> European Journal of Political Economy</span>, 77-89 (1985).</div><div><br />
33. "Should Compensation be Based on Cost or Benefit?"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> International Review of Law and Economics</span>, 173-185 (1985).</div><div><br />
34. "Pigovian Taxes which Work in the Small Number Case,"<span style="font-style: italic;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Environmental Economics and Management</span>,144-154 (1985).</div><div><br />
35. "Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?" </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 185-214 (1985).</div><div><br />
36. "Multicandidate Equilibria," <span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice</span>, 287-291 (1984).</div><div><br />
37. "The Geometry of Justice," <span style="font-style: italic;">Theory and Decision</span>, 239-250 (1984).</div><div><br />
38. "Liability for Harm or Restitution for Benefit?"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 57-80 (1984).</div><div><br />
39. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis,"<span style="font-style: italic;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> American Political Science Review, </span>142-157 (1983).</div><div><br />
40. "A Comparison of Regulation and Liability Rules Under Imperfect Information," with M. White,</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Legal Studies, </span>413-426 (1983).<br /> Reprinted in Kathleen Segerson (ed.) <span style="font-style: italic;">Economics and Liability</span><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">for Environmental Problems</span>, </div><div> Ashgate Publishing,</div><div><br /></div><div>
41. "The Peak Income Hypothesis: An Econometric Reinvestigation'<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Review of Economics and Statistics</span>, 357-360 (1983)</div><div><br />
42. "Pollution Taxes and Optimal Spatial Location," with M. White,<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Economica</span>, 297-311 (1982).</div><div><br />
43. "Efficient Rules of Thumb in Highway Safety and Sporting Activity,"<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;">American Economic Review</span>, 78-90 (1982)<br />
Reprinted in D. Wittman (ed.) <span style="font-style: italic;">Readings in the Economic Analysis </span><span style="font-style: italic;">of Law</span>, Blackwell, 2003.</div><div><br />
44. "Nonmyopic Equilibria in 2x2 Games," with S. Brams,<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Conflict Management and Peace Science</span>, 39-62 (1981).</div><div><br />
45. "Optimal Pricing of Sequential Inputs: Last Clear Chance, Mitigation of Damages and</div><div> Related Doctrines in the Law<span style="font-style: italic;">," </span><br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 65-91 (1981)</div><div><br />
46. "Optimal Spatial Location Under Pollution: Liability Rules and Zoning, with M. White, </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>,249-268 (1981).</div><div><br />
47. "First Come, First Served: An Economic Analysis of Coming to the Nuisance,"</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 557-568 (1980).</div><div><br />
48. "A Diagrammatic Exposition of Justice," </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Theory and Decision</span>, 207-237 (1979).</div><div><br />
49. "How a War Ends," <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Conflict Resolution</span>, 743-763 (1979).<br />
Reprinted in Keith Hartley and Todd Sandler (eds.)<span style="font-style: italic;">Economics of Conflict</span>, Elgar (2003)</div><div><br />
50. "Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model,"<br />
<i> Journal of Economic Theory,</i> 180-189 (1977).</div><div><br />
51. "Prior Regulation vs. Post Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring," </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 193-211 (1977).</div><div><br />
52. "Estimating Voter Participation," by D. Ashenfelter and S. Kelley, comment.</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Law and Economics,</span> 735-741 (1976).</div><div><br />
53. "The Politics of Medical Inflation," (with T. Marmor and T. Heagy),<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Journal of Health Politics</span> <span style="font-style: italic;">and Law</span>, (1976).</div>
<div>
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"> </span> Reprinted in Ingeborg Mauksch (ed.), <i>National Health Insurance</i>(1979). <br />
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"></span> Reprinted in Theodore Marmor, Jon Christianson, <i>Health Care Policy: </i></div><div><i> A Political Economy Approach,</i> Sage, (1982).</div><div><br />
54. "Various Concepts of Power: Equivalence Among Ostensibly Unrelated Approaches,"</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">British Journal of Political Science</span>, 29-462 (1976).</div><div><br />
55. "Punishment as Retribution," <span style="font-style: italic;">Theory and Decision</span>, 209-237 (1974).</div><div><br />
56. "Two Views of Procedure," <span style="font-style: italic;">Journal of Legal Studies</span>, 249-256 (1974).</div><div><br />57. "Optimal Cheating and Control," with C. Nichols, <span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice</span>, (1973).</div><div><br />
58. "Parties as Utility Maximizers," <span style="font-style: italic;">American Political Science Review</span>, 490 -498 (1973).<br />
Spanish translation, "Los Partidos, Como Maximizadores de Utilidad" in Joaquin Velasco del Mazo </div><div> (ed.), <span style="font-style: italic;">Democracia y </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Economia Politica</span>, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, Madrid, 1980.</div><div>
<br />
<span style="font-weight: bold;">CHAPTERS IN BOOKS</span></div>
<div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
1. <a href="https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199684267.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199684267-e-40" target="_blank">"Ex Ante vs Ex Pos</a>t" in Francesco Parisi (ed.)<i> </i><i>Oxford Handbook of Law and Economics</i>. 2017.</div><div><br />
2. "The end of special interests theory and the beginning of a more positive view of democratic politics" </div><div> in E. Balleisen and D. Moss (eds.) <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;">Toward a New Theory of Regulation, </span><span class="Apple-style-span">Cambridge University </span><span class="Apple-style-span">Press</span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span"> </span>2010.</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
3. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/theoocracy.newD.pdf">Theocracy and the evolution of morals</a>" in Wintrobe andmFerrero (eds. </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;"> The Political Economy of Theocracy</span>, Palsgrave MacMillan 2008</div><div>.</div>
<div>
4. The power to propose versus the power to oppose." In Braham and Steffan (eds)</div><div> Power, Freedom and Voting, Springer 2008</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
5. "<a href="http://www.blogger.com/goog_602236051">Hobbes and the Political Economy of Powe</a><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;"><a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/hobbesnewest.pdf">r</a>." In Gosselin and </span></span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: normal;">Marciano </span></span>(eds.) </div><div><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;"> Democracy, Freedom and Coercion</span>, 2007.</div><div><br />
6. "The Reach of Political Economy" with Barry Weingast in Weingast and Wittman (eds.)</div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy</span>, 2006.</div>
<div>
Reprinted in Robert Goodin (ed.) <span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-style: italic;">Handbook of Political Science</span>.Oxford. 2009.</div><div><br />
7. "Pressure Groups and Uninformed Voters," <span style="font-style: italic;">Encyclopedia of </span><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice</span>,</div><div> Charles Rowley and Fritz Schneider (eds.)Kluwer, 2004.</div><div><br />
8. "Efficiency of Democracy," <span style="font-style: italic;">Encyclopedia of Public Choice</span>, </div><div> Charles Rowley and Fritz Schneider (eds.) Kluwer, 2004.</div><div><br /></div><div>
9. "Public Finance without Guilt: Why Normative Public Finance is Positive Public Finance, in </div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Political Economy and Public Finance.</span> S. Winer andi H. Shibata (eds.) Edgar Elgar, 2003.</div><div><br /></div><div>
10. "Comment on William Niskanen, 'On the origin and identification of government failure'," in </div><div> <span style="font-style: italic;">Political Economy and Public Finance</span>, S. Winer and H. Shibata (eds.) Edgar Elgar, 2003.'</div><div><br />
11. "<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.altruism.pdf">When does Altruism Overcome the Intransitivity of Income </a> <a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/articles/wittman.altruism.pdf">Distribution?</a>" in <span style="font-style: italic;">Rational Foundations of Democratic Politics</span>, Albert Breton et. al. (eds.) Cambridge University Press, 2003.</div><div><br /></div><div>
12. "General Structure of the Law" in <span style="font-style: italic;">Encyclopedia of Law and </span><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Economics</span>, Edward Elgar Press, 2000.</div><div><br />
13. "Political Parties, Pressure Groups, and Democracy: A Transaction Cost Theory of Political </div><div> Institutions" in Samuel Bowles, Maurizio Francine and Ugo Pagano (eds.)<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> The Politics and Economics of Power</span>. Routledge, 1999.</div><div><br />
14. "Contest Design and the Objective of the Contest Designer," co-authored with N.r Singh in</div><div> M. Baye (ed.) <span style="font-style: italic;">Advances in </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Applied Microeconomics</span>,Volume 7, Greenwich, CT, 1998.</div><div><br />
15 "Last Clear Chance" in <span style="font-style: italic;">The New Palsgrave Dictionary of Economics </span><span style="font-style: italic;">and the</span><span style="font-style: italic;"> Law</span>, </div><div> Macmillan, 1998.</div><div><br />
16."<a href="http://people.ucsc.edu/%7Ewittman/nuisance.html">Coming to the Nuisance</a>" in <span style="font-style: italic;">The New Palsgrave Dictionary of </span><span style="font-style: italic;"> Economics </span><span style="font-style: italic;"> and </span><span style="font-style: italic;">the Law</span>, </div><div> Macmillan, 1998.</div><div>
<span class="Apple-tab-span" style="white-space: pre;"></span> Reprinted in D. Wittman (ed.) <span style="font-style: italic;">Readings in the Economic Analysis </span><span style="font-style: italic;">of Law</span>, Blackwell, 2003.</div><div><br />
17. "The Good Samaritan Rule" in <span style="font-style: italic;">The New Palsgrave Dictionary of </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Economics </span><span style="font-style: italic;">and </span><span style="font-style: italic;">the Law</span>, </div><div> Macmillan, 1998.</div><div><br />
18. "Liability for Harm versus Restitution for Benefit" in </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> The New</span><span style="font-style: italic;">Palsgrave </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Dictionary </span><span style="font-style: italic;">of Economics and the Law</span>, Macmillan, 1998.</div><div><br />
19. "Term Limits as Political Redistribution" with Daniel Friedman in B. Grofman (ed.)</div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Legislative Term Limits: A Public Choice </span><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Perspective</span>, Kluwer (1996)</div><div><br />
20. "Contrasting Economic and Psychological Analyses of Political Choice: An Economist's Perspective </div><div> on Why Cognitive Psychology does not Explain Democratic Politics" in Kristen Monroe (ed.)<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> The Economic Approach to Politics, </span>Harper Collins (1991)</div><div><br />
21. "Spatial Strategies when Candidates have Policy Preferences," in J. Enelow and M. Hinich (eds.) </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Readings in the Spatial Theory of </span><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Voting</span>, Cambridge University Press (1990).</div><div><br />
22. "An Economic Analysis of the Federalist Papers: The Constituti n as an Optimal Social Contract," in </div><div> B. Grofman and D. Wittman (eds.) <span style="font-style: italic;">The Federalist Papers: </span><span style="font-style: italic;">The New Institutionalism and the</span><br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Old</span>, Agathon Press, 1989.</div><div><br />
23. "Elections with N Voters, M Candidates and K Issues," in M. Holler (ed.) </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> The Logic of Multiparty Systems </span>Kluwer (1987)</div><div><br />
24. "Markets as Poolers of Information," in B. Grofman and G. Owen<br />
(eds.)<span style="font-style: italic;"> Information Pooling and Group Decision Making</span>, JAI Press 1986.</div><div><br /></div><div>
25. "A Priori Probabilities of Coalition Formation and Power Measurement," in Manfred Holler, (Ed.) </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Coalition and </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Collective Action</span>, Physics-Verlag, 1984.</div><div><br />
26. "Zoning May Be No Worse Than its Alternatives," with R. Grieson in R. Grieson, (Ed.), </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> Housing and Urban Economics</span>, Lexington Heath, 1982.</div><div><br /></div><div>
27. "Power in Ideological Space," in M. Holler (ed.), <span style="font-style: italic;">Power, Voting, and Voting Power</span>,</div><div> Physica-Verlag, 1982.</div><div><br />
28. "Equivalent Concepts of Power," in M. Holler (ed.), <span style="font-style: italic;">Power, Voting, and Voting </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Power</span>, </div><div> Physica-Verlag, 1982.</div><div><br />
29. "Short Run vs. Long Run Solutions to Spatial Externalities," with M. White, in D. Rubenfeld (Ed.),<br />
<span style="font-style: italic;"> Law and Economics of Local Government</span>, Urban Institute 1980.</div><div><br />
30. "Power in Electoral Games," in C.A. Hooker (Ed.), <span style="font-style: italic;"> Foundations of Decision Theory</span>, Reidel, 1978.</div><div><br />
31. "Politics, Public Policy and Medical Inflation," <span style="font-style: italic;">with T. Marmor and T. Heagy, </span>in Michael Zubkoff </div><div> (ed.), <span style="font-style: italic;">Health Care Inflation, </span>Milbank Memorial Fund, 1976.</div><div><br /></div><div>
32. "Political Decision Making," in Robert D. Leiter, Gerald Sirkin (Eds.),</div><div><span> </span><span style="font-style: italic;">Economics of Public Choice</span>, Cyrco Press, 1975.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-weight: bold;">REVIEWS</span><br />
<br /></div>
<div>
<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;">1.</span><span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;"> "</span><span class="Apple-style-span">What is Wrong with Phelps’s Analysis of the West’s </span><span class="Apple-style-span">Economies?" </span></div><div><span class="Apple-style-span"><i> Homo Oeconomicus</i> </span><span class="Apple-style-span">(</span>2016) 33: 51</div><div><br /></div>
<div>
2. "The Myth of the Rational Voter?" <i>Critical Review</i>, 2008<span class="Apple-style-span" style="font-weight: bold;">.</span></div><div><b><br /></b>
3. "Mancur Olson. Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships," </div><div><span style="font-style: italic;"> The Annals of Political and Social Sciences</span>, 2000.</div><div><br />
4. "Albert Breton. Competitive Governments," <span style="font-style: italic;">Southern Economic Journal</span>, 1998..</div><div><br /></div><div>
5. "William Keech. Economic Politics," <span style="font-style: italic;">Governance</span>, April 1996, 9:242-4.</div><div><br />
6. "Charles Wolf, Jr., Markets or Governments: Choosing between Imperfect Alternatives,"</div><div><i> P</i><span style="font-style: italic;">ublic Choice</span>, 1989.</div><div><br /></div><div>
7. "Kenneth Boulding, The Economics of Love and Fear," <span style="font-style: italic;">Public Choice,</span> 1974.<br />
<br /><span style="font-weight: bold;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
Donald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-8881698769891478483.post-2874626094657909332006-12-17T14:02:00.000-08:002006-12-17T15:08:09.237-08:00Research InterestsMy research interests range over law, politics, philosophy, and microeconomics. I have written on democratic institutions, arms control, litigation and dispute resolution, externalities, economic contests, and theories of justice.Donald Wittmanhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/11997666543084842505noreply@blogger.com