I'm a professor in the Department of Economics at the University of California, Santa Cruz. I use the tools of economics to explain a wide variety of subjects, including law (torts, contracts, takings, litigation, and the good Samaritan rule), democratic politics (candidates, voters, pressure groups, and legislatures), international relations (war, the size of nations, and arms control verification), purely economic topics (contests and mechanism design) and an assortment of unrelated topics (sports rules, theocracy, and family dynamics).
My most recent work is on "Evolution and Depression" co-authored with Nirvikar Singh. Here is the abstract: The standard evolutionary explanation for depression is that being emotionally depressed is adaptive. We argue that being depressed is not adaptive (indeed, quite the opposite), but that the threat of depression for bad outcomes and the promise of pleasure for good outcomes are adaptive because they motivate people toward undertaking effort that increases fitness. We first model the optimal emotional incentive structure and then discuss suboptimal outcomes, including bipolar disorder, unipolar depression, and lack of motivation.
"Strategic behavior and organizational structure of religions" is another one of my recent endeavors. My most recent books are The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, which I co-edited with Barry Weingast, and Economic Foundations of Law and Organization. Here is a list of all my publications.